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Centrifugal federalism, 1967–1974
Introducing centrifugal federalism: The constitutional 
amendments, 1967–1971
Between 1967 and 1974 Yugoslavia entered a period of intensive constitutional 
change that started with a series of amendments to the 1963 Constitution and 
ended with the adoption of a new Yugoslav Constitution in 1974, its fourth in 
thirty years. One could claim that these changes transformed the country into 
a confederation of its republics. The centrifugal dynamic of transferring ever 
more powers from the federal centre to the subunits soon reached the point of 
making the centre dependent on consensus among quasi-independent republics, 
empowered even with certain prerogatives usually reserved for sovereign states 
in the international system.
Centrifugal federalism started to determine political life in Yugoslavia 
in April 1967 with the adoption of the first six constitutional amendments. 
Curiously, these far-reaching changes were adopted at the initiative of the 
Bosnian leadership that, unsatisfied with a decision of the Managing Board 
of the federal fund for allocation of resources for underdeveloped regions, 
had convened a special meeting of the Chamber of Nationalities (Burg 1983: 
67–68). This usually passive institution got, politically speaking, a second wind 
and demanded changes in the Constitution that would assure a more important 
political role for the republics and a more potent political role for the Chamber 
itself. The reforms were clearly going in the direction of reducing the power 
of the Federation (see Haug 2012: 203–212; Hondius 1968: 325–326; also Burg 
1983; Ramet 2006; Rusinow 1977).
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The first constitutional amendment revitalized the Chamber of 
Nationalities. Beforehand, this Chamber had mandatorily convened only 
when constitutional changes were debated. Now it acquired an equal status to 
the Federal Chamber itself. This, in turn, enhanced the power of the republics 
and, surprisingly, of the autonomous provinces. At the urging of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina, the minimum number of delegates entitled to convene the session 
of the Chamber was reduced from ten to five, which happened to be the 
number of delegates of each autonomous province. Subsequently, this allowed 
them to act more independently from Serbia. One amendment (4) clearly 
confirmed the decentralization trend. From then on, the republican public 
prosecutors were to be appointed by the republican assemblies and not by the 
federal public prosecutor, which was the direct result of the fall of Ranković a 
year earlier. The state security apparatus was consequently put under not only 
federal but also republican control as well (amendment 4, point 1), whereas 
only the Yugoslav army was left under the exclusive jurisdiction of the centre.
Although these steps were relatively modest in scope, voices discussing 
the confederalization of Yugoslavia were immediately heard (see Burg 1983: 
67; Hondius 1968: 329; Rusinow 1977: 226). Hondius, who finished his study 
just after the adoption of the amendments, could not have known that this 
was only the beginning of the progressive confederalization of what he then 
already called the ‘genuine federation’ (1968: 329).
The new amendments adopted in 1968 and 1971 not only confirmed 
the general trend but also went even further. They inevitably brought back 
to the table ‘the national question’ or, more ominously, suggested that it was 
not properly ‘solved’. ‘Once the amendment process has been initiated,’ Burg 
emphasizes, ‘it opens the door for further debate not only over relationships 
between the constituent units but also over relationships between the nations 
that inhabit them’ (1983: 68). ‘It was an irony of history,’ Hondius concludes, 
‘which, in 1967, made Bosnia and Hercegovina take the initiative for the first 
meeting of the Chamber of Nationalities, which led eventually to a confirmation 
of the link between peoples and Republics’ (1968: 343). More than two decades 
later, Bosnia, as the only true multinational republic, became the greatest victim 
of the principle that independent states, after the collapse of Yugoslavia, should 
be the homogenous nation-states of their ethnic majorities with their borders 
redrawn accordingly: the principle that would brutally attempt to eliminate its 
only true (Bosnian) exception.
In December 1968, another set of amendments (numbers 7–19) further 
empowered the Chamber of Nationalities. The Federal Chamber of the Federal 
Assembly was abolished with all competences delegated to the Chamber of 
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Nationalities now consisting of twenty deputies from the republics and ten from 
the provinces. Since all federal legislation had to be approved by the Chamber 
of Nationalities, it automatically turned it into the most powerful chamber.
As mentioned above, the flip side of the process of the confederalization 
of Yugoslavia was the federalization of Serbia, which also started in 1967 
and 1968 and was confirmed in the 1974 Constitution. Amendment 7 
constitutionally redefined the autonomous provinces as constitutive units of 
the Federation; they were not mentioned as constitutive parts of Yugoslavia 
in article 2 of the 1963 Constitution. Vojvodina and Kosovo were basically 
made equal to the republics. The provinces acquired their own supreme courts 
and their borders could not be altered without their consent. The League of 
Communists of Serbia was reorganized and separate Leagues of Communists 
were established in Kosovo and Vojvodina. Also, all rights usually guaranteed 
to the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia were guaranteed to all ethnic non-
South-Slavic minorities (in this case Albanian and Magyar minorities) such as 
the use of a national language in public institutions. Nevertheless, the provinces 
remained subordinated to Serbia’s sovereignty. They had neither the right 
to secede nor the right to their proper citizenship laws, their own police or 
territorial defence forces. Technically speaking, Serbia was not partitioned into 
three areas (Vojvodina, Kosovo and Serbia proper). Serbia proper was mostly 
used as a regional term but was not a political entity, although only in Serbia 
proper could the Serbian authorities act without confronting the obstacles of 
the provincial autonomies. In other words, within Serbia, two regions acquired 
a large autonomy, but remained under Serbia’s nominal sovereignty.
In his 2003 study, Dejan Jović dedicates a whole chapter to the reasons 
why Serbia accepted the constitutional changes between 1967 and 1974 that 
eventually amounted to its proper federalization (2003a: 157–207). Jović argues 
that Serbia’s political elite accepted Kardelj’s ideas on the constitutional changes 
in Yugoslavia precisely because it saw in these changes the realization of both 
Serbia’s national interests and the general ideological interest of Yugoslav 
socialist society. The changes were supposed to guarantee the preservation 
of Yugoslavia with Serbia as equal partner to the other republics and ethnic 
groups within and without Serbia (eliminating the possibility that Serbia could 
be accused of dominating and exploiting the others). But if this rationale 
prevailed among anti-nationalist and liberal-minded Serbian communists, 
other segments of Serbian society, the cultural and literary scene and, later in 
the 1980s, the political establishment as well, immediately started to question 
Serbia’s role in the federation, claiming that the constitutional changes were to 
Serbia’s disadvantage.
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A year later, in 1969, each Yugoslav republic acquired one of the most 
important elements of sovereignty and statehood, namely, a proper military 
force. The new defence law established republican territorial defence forces 
(teritorijalna o(d)brana)1 – and put them under exclusive republican control. In 
June 1971, a new series of twenty-two constitutional amendments was adopted. 
The end result of these amendments was the further reduction of the federal 
authorities’ powers. Amendment 20 – that was to be incorporated into the 1974 
Constitution – confirmed the republics’ sovereignty, including all sovereign 
powers except those reserved exclusively for the Federation, now reduced only 
to foreign affairs, the military, common monetary policy, the regulation of the 
unitary Yugoslav market and the preservation of ethnonational and individual 
rights. All federal organs were to be formed on the principle of republican and 
provincial parity including the State presidency (consisting of 23 members 
including Tito), the Federal Executive Committee (SIV), the Chamber of 
Nationalities, the Constitutional Court and the administrative personnel of the 
federal ministries (see Burg 1983: 204–206).
Another important innovation was the creation of five inter-republican 
committees within the SIV that were supposed to design common policies 
in the areas of development, the monetary system, foreign trade and hard 
currency, the market and finance. Together with the chairman of the SIV, they 
were composed of nine delegates who were solely responsible to the republics 
and provinces (Ramet 2006: 248). The work of the committees proved to be 
very efficient in spite of the new rule (amendment 33) on the harmonization 
of positions (usuglašavanje) and consent in economic matters. On the other 
hand, as Lampe observes, ‘the Committees’ very success in making working 
arrangements between the republics made the federation’s legislation process 
and representatives, whether elected or delegated, seem irrelevant’ (2000: 312).
Yugoslavia as confederation: The constitution of 1974
As a whole, the set of forty-two amendments adopted between 1967 and 
1971 profoundly and irrevocably confederalized Yugoslavia. These changes 
provoked opposing reactions. The debates at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade in 
1971 caused a scandal. It resulted in a two-year prison sentence (reduced later 
to nine months) for Mihailo Đurić, a professor of the Belgrade Law Faculty, 
who claimed that the amendments had changed the nature of the federation, 
reduced Yugoslavia to a ‘geographical term’ and created almost independent 
and mutually opposed national states. He thought that such a development 
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would significantly affect the position of Serbs who live in great numbers 
outside Serbia and underlined an inadequacy of republican borders, especially 
in the case of Serbia.2 In Croatia, on the other hand, the amendments were 
seen as only a first step towards the realization of Croatian national aspirations, 
many of which were formulated in the pages of Hrvatski tjednik (Croatian 
Weekly), published by the traditional Croatian cultural organization Matica 
hrvatska (Rusinow 1977: 283). By the end of that year, the Croatian Spring 
mass movement demanding independent state-like autonomy for Croatia in 
economic and political matters was crushed. Young Croatian leaders (Mika 
Tripalo, Pero Pirker, Savka Dabčević-Kučar), who tolerated the nationalist 
‘excesses’ of Matica hrvatska and the student organizations, were removed from 
office and replaced with conservative communists from within the Croatian 
party. Soon after the purge of Croatian leaders and series of arrests of student 
leaders or public intellectuals, the young Serbian leadership – accused not of 
nationalism but of liberalism – was also removed. And although this reassertion 
of Tito’s power, i.e. the power of the federal centre and the central organs of 
the Party, could make one think that the heyday of centrifugal federalism had 
come to an end, exactly the opposite happened. Centrifugal federalism was 
fully endorsed and the confederalization of Yugoslavia confirmed in the 1974 
Constitution.
One of the longest constitutions in the world (406 articles!) defined the SFRY 
in its elaborate and complicated first article as:
[A] federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united 
nations [peoples] and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous 
Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia, based on the power and self-management of the working class 
and all working people; it is a socialist self-managing democratic community 
of working people and citizens and of nations and nationalities, having equal 
rights3. (Constitution of SFRY 1974)
The competing ‘sovereigns’ – the working class, all working people, citizens, 
nations and nationalities, republics, peoples of the republics – were again put 
in the same confusing sentence mixing overlapping political communities. In 
perfect harmony with the post-1967 spirit of confederalization, the republics 
were defined as ‘states based on the sovereignty of people’ and autonomous 
provinces as ‘autonomous socialist self-managing democratic socio-political 
communities’. The republics were ‘states’ whereas the federation was only a ‘state 
community’ (Dimitrijević 1995: 58). Naturally, these states had the right to self-
determination and secession. Serbian legal scholar Vojin Dimitrijević correctly 
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points out that the Constitution provided this right ‘without envisaging the 
corresponding procedure’ (1995: 71). This would leave the use of this right open 
to contending interpretations in the final years of Yugoslavia.
Three-stage elections for local, republican and federal assemblies took place 
in April and May of 1974 through a complicated ‘system of delegations and 
delegates’ (for details see Rusinow 1977: 331; Višnjić 1977: 73–91). The voters 
directly elected only members of the tricameral communal assemblies (chambers 
for labour, local government and social-political issues) who then sent delegates 
to the similar tricameral republican and provincial assemblies that, in turn, sent 
delegates to the bicameral federal assembly consisting of the Federal Chamber 
(thirty delegates from each republic and twenty from each province) and the 
Chamber of Republics and Provinces (twelve delegates from the republics and 
eight from the provinces). In the first round, 820,000 delegates were elected 
from 12,000 communities and 60,000 work units; in the second, 500 communal 
chambers voted for delegates to the republican and provincial chambers; in 
the final third round, they elected delegates representing their republics and 
provinces in the two federal chambers (Lampe 2000: 313). Politically speaking, 
the system of elections at the lowest level and then three rounds of delegation 
towards the higher levels secured, in the words of Serbian political scientist 
Laszlo Sekelj, ‘absolute control over the electoral procedure by informal, non-
elected, non-institutionalized, and uncontrollable local oligarchies’ (in Lampe 
2000: 314).
In the federal organs, all decisions were made unanimously through a 
procedure of harmonization of positions among the republics, i.e. their 
delegations voting en bloc (not their members). Needless to say, the republics 
had the right of veto over all federal decisions which prevented the federal 
institutions from acting independently. This was, in Dimitrijević’s opinion, ‘the 
real and fatal flaw’ of the 1974 Constitution (1995: 60). In 1981, another set 
of eight constitutional amendments was adopted in order to allow the proper 
functioning of the federal bodies such as the Federal Executive Committee 
(the federal government and its prime minister), the Presidency and the 
Constitutional court (see Amandmani 1988 [1981]).
The 1974 Constitution of the SFRY was meant to be the peak of the 
proclaimed politics of decentralization that started at the Sixth Congress of 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1952. Among scholars, observers and 
participants, a general consensus exists that 1974 Constitution confirmed 
the confederal structure of the Yugoslav state. Yugoslav politicians called it a 
‘cooperative federal system’ and its main ideologist, Edvard Kardelj, qualified it 
Brothers as Partners 77
already in 1971 as neither ‘a classical federation … nor … a classic confederation, 
but... a socialist, self-managing community of nations’ (in Ramet 1992: 63). 
This fédéralisme dénaturé, as a French observer put it (Drouet 1997: 85), based 
at the federal level on the rule of consent and unanimity, was characterized by 
the ever-growing dependence of federal institutions on constitutive republics. 
The centre had to operate through the republics to ‘implement virtually all 
policies, to gather revenues and to establish connections with the citizenry’ 
that, as Valerie Bunce reminds us, amounts to quite a precise definition of 
confederalism (1999: 111).
The unstoppable decentralization
In April 1969, general elections were held for communal, republican and federal 
chambers and assemblies.4 However, it was also the year of a destabilizing 
economic affair, known as the road affair or the road building crisis (cestna 
afera) that hit Yugoslavia at its most delicate spot, namely the relations 
between the federation and its subunits. When the Federal Executive Council 
decided not to distribute the funds received from the World Bank for certain 
road building projects in Slovenia, unanimous and loud protests against the 
federal government erupted in Slovenia (Burg 1983: 88–100). Moreover, at 
the very beginning of 1970 the Tenth Congress of the LC of Croatia took a 
strong stance against unitarism and bureaucratic centralism in Yugoslavia. It 
was the beginning of the ‘Croatian crisis’ during which economic questions 
and debates – concerning relations between developed and underdeveloped 
republics, foreign currency and the economic independence of the republics 
vis-à-vis the federal centre – were inevitably perceived in ethnonational terms 
and as inter-ethnic conflicts.
The LCY’s presidency adopted a resolution in April 1970 in which it 
mentioned the ‘sovereignty’ of the republics and provinces. In September 1970 
in Zagreb, Tito announced the future reorganization of the Federation and the 
creation of the Presidency (see his speech in Kobsa et al. 1978: 445–449). New 
constitutional decentralizing reforms followed suit in 1971 and then finally 
peaked with the new 1974 Constitution. A year before, in 1973, a Party document 
defined Yugoslav federation as ‘a function of the statehood and sovereignty of 
each republic and province’.5 In the same year, Edvard Kardelj confirms the 
confederalization of Yugoslavia by stating that the power of the federation is not 
autonomous, but rather ‘stems from the republics, and not vice versa’ (in Jović 
2003a: 146).
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The political and constitutional decentralization of Yugoslavia was followed 
by a concomitant decentralization – along with a burgeoning self-sufficiency 
among the republics – in other domains such as economics, media, culture, 
science and education. The effects of decentralization were evident, for instance, 
in the independent electricity systems, in the absence of common policy in the 
important areas of science and education as well as in paradoxical situations 
such as when Serbia proper imported wheat while its autonomous province of 
Vojvodina exported it abroad (Udovički 1995: 294). In the media sector there 
was no federal TV station. Instead, there were independent republican TV 
centres that created a small amount of common broadcasting. These republican 
radios and televisions were predictably dependent on republican-level political 
centres and would become main venues of nationalistic propaganda at the end 
of the 1980s and in the early 1990s and would play a major political role during 
the war (Allcock 2000: 292; Thompson 1999). Andrew Wachtel describes the 
absence of a common educational curriculum in the fields of literature, culture 
and history (1998). The civil society sector was divided along republican lines 
as well, even more so after the mid-1960s (see Irvine 1997). In 1981, in a paper 
on the Yugoslav national question as ‘unfinished business,’ Dennison Rusinow 
drew an early and revealing comparison between Yugoslavia and the European 
integration process: ‘The individual republics now have nearly as much control 
over their economic fortunes and cultural identities as the sovereign states in 
the European Economic Community (which means that their control is not 
unlimited or free of intra-Yugoslav and wider interdependence)’ (1981: 10).
The radical decentralization and confederalization of Yugoslavia stripped 
the federal centre of its classic state prerogatives but, in turn, consolidated 
the statehood of the republics and reinforced their state apparatuses. The 
process can be described, in the words of Valerie Bunce, as ‘Yugoslavia’s losing 
“stateness” from the 1970s onwards and its republics gaining statehood during 
the same period’ (Bunce 1997: 349). Interestingly, Tito seemed to be aware of 
this in 1971 when he warned the republics not to ‘divide up statism’ among 
themselves (in Jović 2003b: 176). Jović himself comments that Kardelj’s anti-
statist rhetoric actually strengthened statism in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia 
(2003b: 180). Decentralization was thus contained only at the level of the 
federal state, but did not take roots at the republican level, except in the case of 
Serbia whose federalization mirrored the confederalization of the country as a 
whole. In other words, the de-étatization of the Federation went hand in hand 
with the étatisme of the republics. The State, as such, was not actually in the 
process of withering away in Yugoslavia. What eventually withered away was 
only Yugoslavia itself.
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From federal to confederal citizenship
The hybrid structure of Yugoslavia resulting from the constitutional changes 
between 1967 and 1974 was also manifested in the constitutional definitions 
of federal and republican citizenship. According to article 249 of the last (1974) 
Constitution of the SFR Yugoslavia, citizens possessed a ‘single citizenship of 
the SFRY’ and every citizen of a republic was ‘simultaneously’ a citizen of the 
SFRY. The third line of the Article confirms that ‘a citizen of a republic on the 
territory of another republic has the same rights and obligations as the citizens 
of that republic’. In fact, this created confusion in legal literature over the 
question of primacy between federal and republican-level citizenship. During 
the high time of socialist Yugoslavia, it was mostly law students who took an 
interest in this tricky question, the precise answer to which became of utmost 
importance when the dissolution of the federation occurred. If one takes into 
consideration the views of legal experts, it is evident that no consensus exists on 
the question of primacy. Some authors cite the simultaneity and identity of the 
two citizenships (Pejić 1998) or find, in the equality of the rights and duties of a 
citizen of one republic living in the other, evidence of ‘the primacy of Yugoslav 
citizenship over those of different republics’ (Drouet 1997: 84) and describe the 
pre-eminence of federal citizenship as ‘an important guarantee for minorities 
facing the majority “nation” of one or another republic’ (1997: 91). On the other 
hand, some authors argue that, although only federal citizenship was legal in 
the international arena and republican citizenship had an ‘exclusively internal 
legal role’, republican citizenship had primacy over SFRY citizenship according 
to respective provisions of the 1976 law on SFRY citizenship and the republican 
laws on citizenship (see Muminović 1998: 73; Rakić 1998: 59).
The 1976 law on citizenship of the SFRY brought with it another element 
that could confirm primacy of the subunits and the confederal nature of 
Yugoslavia’s bifurcated citizenship. The Act regulated conditions for acquisition 
and termination of Yugoslav citizenship, but transferred the competencies 
for implementation of the citizenship legislation from the Federal Ministry 
of the Interior to the republican authorities (art. 21, para 2; Jovanović 1977: 
50–51; UNHCR 1997: 8). These competencies included the registration and 
termination of Yugoslav citizenship. Furthermore, the republican supreme 
courts were deemed competent in citizenship matters (such as, for instance, 
complaints against decisions related to citizenship). A somewhat confusing 
and unique situation – namely that subunits decide on Federal citizenship – 
prompted the author of an explanatory introduction to the law on Yugoslav 
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citizenship to question the existence of any role for the federal authority in this 
domain (Jovanović 1977: 51). Unsurprisingly for a confederated structure like 
the one Yugoslavia progressively became after the mid-1960s, the citizenship-
regulating norms showed some similarities to the norms of international law in 
cases of legal collisions among sovereign states (Jovanović 1977: 53). Jovanović 
finds, however, that there is still some room for the Federal authorities on this 
issue considering that they alone are responsible for citizenship matters in the 
international arena, but he admits that the only safe conclusion to be drawn is 
that the new 1976 law does not regulate the matter.
Another striking feature of confederalized citizenship in Yugoslavia was that, 
following the fact that only republican-level registers existed, only republics (and 
even autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo) were entitled to issue 
Yugoslav passports with their own numbers (preceded with the letters signalling 
the republic or the autonomous region of origin). This resulted in a plethora of 
various Yugoslav passports. For instance, passports issued in Kosovo had the 
letters KA before the number and were printed in Albanian, Serbian and French; 
Yugoslav passports issued in Macedonia6 were only in Macedonian and French 
(but not in Serbo-Croatian!).
The almost non-existent awareness of the dual character of citizenship 
in Yugoslavia was shared equally by the citizens and even by legal scholars 
(Medvedović 1998: 49–52). Since republican citizenship did not have any practical 
consequences within the Federation – some would even call it a ‘phantom 
citizenship’ (Pejić 1998: 185) – and since federal citizenship was the stronger 
guarantor of the rights of citizens living outside of their native republics, a fact 
that also stimulated the free movement of people between republics, residence7 
became the most important practical factor in the everyday life of Yugoslavs. 
Yugoslav citizens were, in principle, able to choose their republican citizenship 
depending on their residency or employment. The law on Yugoslav citizenship, 
and the republican laws on citizenship, allowed citizens to change republican 
citizenship. It is interesting to note that after 1964 it was even possible to do so 
without further formalities. On the other hand, after 1976 change of citizenship 
was still allowed by republican laws but only under certain conditions and after 
a legal procedure (Medvedović 1998: 49). Since republican citizenship was of no 
significant practical relevance, citizens usually did not change their republican 
citizenship status if they moved to another republic, and sometimes they did not 
even register change of residence or bother to sort out the republican citizenship 
of their children. Internal Yugoslav migration established strong personal 
and family ties across republican borders, while economically motivated 
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migrations and the resettlement of federal administration personnel resulted in 
a considerable number of individuals living outside of their republic of origin. 
To a certain degree, this would affect the balance of ethnic groups in Yugoslav 
republics, the reality that the new citizenship regimes would try to amend as 
much as possible.
The progressive political empowerment of the republics over the federal 
centre finally altered the character of bifurcated citizenship in Yugoslavia from 
typical federal to confederal citizenship. This change was not explicitly reflected 
in citizenship legislation, although the above-discussed disputes over primacy 
show the tendency to legally codify the confederal structure of Yugoslavia in 
citizenship laws as well. After all, one could hardly imagine how citizenship 
could have been decoupled from the constitutional changes that transformed 
Yugoslavia between 1967 and 1974 into a confederation of republics. In other 
words, the political empowerment of the republics shifted the centre of a citizen’s 
political activity towards his or her republic. Politically, it was basically a one-
way street and the traffic flowed from the republics to the federal plateau where 
republican delegates and representatives discussed and deliberated unanimously 
on their relations and common affairs.
Interestingly, although republican-level citizenship was almost practically 
irrelevant for ordinary citizens in their everyday life, politically speaking it was 
republican belonging and citizenship that increasingly took the leading role. As 
Rusinow reminds us, powerful republican figures were reluctant to abandon their 
local republican bases and move to Belgrade to exercise only federal functions. 
After the death of Tito, the independent position of the republican communist 
elites towards the centre – actually, dependence of the centre on their practice of 
harmonization and agreement – became fully apparent.
At the federal political level, only republican ‘groups’ were allowed access 
through the system of republican delegations, whereas individual citizens could 
act only within their republics. Although it was possible to declare Yugoslav 
ethnonational belonging (narodnost or nacionalnost), those who did so were 
not recognized as nations or nationalities and were thus not represented. 
Although it seems paradoxical – this comes as little surprise in the confederated 
structure that Yugoslavia had become during the last quarter century of its 
existence – Yugoslavs did not have an exclusive territory on their own. One can 
safely conclude that the only ‘group’ within Yugoslavia that could be identified 
as truly Yugoslav, in the sense of using and practicing benefits of Yugoslav 
citizenship, were internal migrants. And many of them woke up one day in 1991 
or 1992 as aliens or simply stateless in Yugoslavia’s successor states.
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Broken partnership: From confederal 
citizenship towards crisis
On 4 May 1980, Josip Broz Tito died in a hospital in Ljubljana. It was exactly 
3.04 p.m. Every Yugoslav could easily remember both the day and the hour of 
Tito’s death, since that moment was commemorated throughout the 1980s in all 
corners of Yugoslavia with wailing sirens. This was the tribute paid by Yugoslav 
citizens to the ‘greatest son of all our nations and nationalities’. He left them 
locked in a system whose paradoxes and impasses, but also numerous beneficial 
possibilities, only he was capable of navigating. His successors would not possess 
the same skills. The slogan ‘Even After Tito – Tito!’ soon proved to be a useless 
mantra. Nevertheless, Tito’s successors did try hard to make the machine work. 
The previous year they had lost the only man who could have served as a guide, 
Edvard Kardelj, statesman and theorist of Yugoslav self-managing socialism. 
A year later, in the Spring of 1981, civil unrest broke out in Kosovo, in a part 
of the country that was historically important for some Yugoslavs (especially 
Serbs) but whose mostly ethnic Albanian population had never felt at ease in the 
common house of the South Slavs.
This is how the last decade of Yugoslavia began. It was marked, among other 
things, by nervous attempts at systemic reforms, an economic downturn, the 
Kosovo crisis, foreign debt headaches, IMF-imposed standby arrangements 
and following austerity measures, massive strikes, the paralysis of federal 
institutions, conflicts within the federal LCY and inter-republican rivalries 
tainted with ominous nationalistic overtones. The fateful rise of Serbia’s 
strongman Slobodan Milošević was followed by Slovenian resistance to his 
Kosovo policy and his recentralization attempts. Nevertheless, he got both of 
the Serbian autonomous provinces and Montenegro under his sway before 1990. 
The story of Yugoslavia’s post-Tito malaise concluded with the disintegration of 
the LCY in January 1990 and the first separately scheduled democratic elections 
in the Yugoslav republics during 1990.
On the other hand, there was a bright side to the 1980s that inspired optimism. 
The regime’s general weakness created an atmosphere of liberalization and 
many quickly learned how to orient themselves in politics, society, culture or the 
grey economy under a ‘soft dictatorship’. Yugoslavia was still a highly respected 
member of the international community and historic leader of the non-aligned 
movement; citizens usually expressed a fairly high level of attachment to their 
country, tourism developed on the Adriatic coast, the Winter Olympic Games 
were hosted successfully by Sarajevo in 1984, Yugoslavs could travel freely 
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and, important for their pride, shop abroad, and a sophisticated urban and 
alternative culture blossomed (see Debeljak 1994; Ramet 2002; Ugrešić 1996).
Many scholars have tried to answer the question of what went wrong in 
Yugoslavia. One has to start with the various failed efforts to reform Yugoslavia’s 
confederal structure during the second half of the 1980s. They reveal that the 
republican elites had conflicting visions of the future of their regime and the 
country in general. Left without the final arbiter and effective federal structures 
that could serve as a bridge or mediator and confronted with economic 
inequalities between the republics, a growing debt crisis, as well as vocal 
demands for political and ideological transformation coming from developing 
civil society, the gap between these elites only grew in the years preceding the 
end of the socialist regime and the subsequent democratization of the Yugoslav 
republics.
Changes in Eastern Europe announced the end of state socialist rule and 
the advent of liberal democracy. Decentralization, centrifugal federalism and 
the earlier abandonment of the unifying Yugoslav political project naturally 
designated the constitutive units as future frameworks of democracy and 
people’s rule. In short, liberal democracy was introduced into a confederated 
country whose very citizenship – as a general basis for any political 
activity – was itself politically confederated. Any political activity after the 
constitutional changes from 1967 to 1974 went from the republics towards 
the federation, and from the republican communist parties to the federal 
Party, and not vice versa, a fact that transformed the republics into primary 
political arenas.
Liberal democracy was thus introduced into a malfunctioning multinational 
confederation and resulted in a further fragmentation of the political space – more 
and more so along ethnic lines – which would jeopardize not only Yugoslavia 
as a state but also the prevailing consensus over its internal borders. I will show 
in the following chapters that insecurity surrounding the issue of citizenship – 
captured by simple questions such as ‘what is the political community and state 
to which I belong?’ and ‘what state guarantees my rights and security?’ – was 
one of the critical factors behind Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration. Although 
rarely analysed and not articulated as the problem of citizenship, the citizenship 
factor must be added to the list of interactive elements that contributed to the 
Yugoslav drama (see Chapters 6–8). I describe how the ethnocentric conception 
of citizenship came to dominate political space and how the idea of creating 
ethnically homogenous states, the project that inevitably challenged the internal 
borders, unleashed a spiral of violence. But to understand this highly complex 
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process whose well-known outcomes were far from inevitable, let us turn once 
more to the final decade of Yugoslavia.
Valerie Bunce identifies three elements necessary for a regime change: 
leadership succession, great reforms and international change (1999). All three 
were present in socialist Europe at the end of the 1980s. However, Bunce observes 
that regime change in Yugoslavia started earlier and, far from being concluded 
in a matter of ‘ten days’ or ‘ten months’ as in some Eastern European countries, 
it was played out over an entire decade following Tito’s death. The potential 
emergence of a ‘new Tito’, or at the very least a pan-Yugoslav leader, was aborted 
by the confederal system itself. The period was thus characterized by a series 
of more or less unsuccessful successions of leadership and several attempts at 
economic and political reforms. Finally, once the international system started 
to change with Gorbachev’s accession in 1985 and more dramatically in 1989, 
Yugoslavia seemed well prepared for regime change. Although many feared the 
outcome, regime change did not have to entail the dismemberment of the state 
itself. Although it seemed that everyone in Yugoslavia had acknowledged the 
need for change, the country experienced a chronic lack of consensus about these 
changes and common initiatives – with some notable exceptions – that would 
formulate this vision in pan-Yugoslav terms. Prior to Milošević’s accession to 
power in Serbia in 1987, several groups formed along the dividing lines between 
conservatives and liberals or between recentralizers and decentralists. Liberal 
recentralizers were in power in Serbia, conservative recentralizers controlled 
Bosnia and Montenegro, liberal decentralists dominated Slovenia and Vojvodina 
while conservative decentralists held the reins in Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo 
(Ramet 2006: 333). Another line of conflict separated those who defended the 
1974 Constitution from those who advocated its reform (see Jović 2003a).
The disintegration process in socialist multinational federations began, Bunce 
argues, ‘when crisis over power and reform weakened the regimes, mobilized 
publics, “republicanized” the state, and “nationalized” political protest’ (1999: 
98). In the Yugoslav case, the decisive events that would eventually lead to 
disintegration took place during 1986 and 1987. Slobodan Milošević and Milan 
Kučan, two crucial players from the final years of Yugoslavia, took over important 
political positions within their republican parties in 1986. By November of the 
same year, the Yugoslav republics achieved full fiscal sovereignty (Woodward 
1995a: 74), a largely unnoticed event that only confirmed that the centrifugal 
machine of Yugoslav federalism was still in high gear. In September 1986, a draft 
of the famous (or infamous) Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (SANU) leaked to the public. This document would later be widely 
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considered a manifesto for the creation of a greater Serbian state on the ruins of 
Yugoslavia, a political programme espoused by both left-wing and right-wing 
Serbian nationalists and, finally, by its champion, Slobodan Milošević.
However, the Memorandum of the SANU was, in Dragović-Soso’s view, less a 
programme for a Greater Serbia and more a litany of Serbian grievances against 
Yugoslavia. These grievances were formulated in literary circles and Belgrade 
salons and would resurge in newspapers or in theatre shows. The Memorandum 
referred to the ‘ongoing genocide’ against Serbs in Kosovo and employed other 
appalling language, which resonated strongly within Serb community (2008: 19). 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that this list of Serbian grievances against Yugoslavia’s 
confederal and Serbia’s federal structure was drafted by the members of the most 
prestigious Serbian intellectual institution and endorsed, with varying degrees 
of explicitness, by important intellectual figures within the biggest federal unit 
was in itself – regardless of the initial intentions of the drafters and their later 
open advocacy of a Greater Serbia – an aggressive attack on the communist 
solution to the national question, which was perhaps the greatest taboo in 
socialist Yugoslavia.
In the same year of 1986, the SFRY Presidency started to prepare new 
amendments to the 1974 Constitution which were intended to solve the 
Federation’s paralysis and deal with ‘hot’ issues such as the relationship between 
the federation and its subunits, relations within Serbia itself and the unity of 
Yugoslav market. In January 1987, the Presidency’s proposals included creation 
of a unified legal system, central control of the railroads, postal and telephone 
services and the unification of the Yugoslav economy. It is small wonder that 
proposals for a stronger Federation were welcomed in Serbia and largely rejected 
in Slovenia (Ramet 2006: 335–337).
On 24 April 1987, Slobodan Milošević came to the village of Kosovo Polje 
near the site of the 1389 battle between a diverse Christian coalition and the 
Ottomans that regardless of its real historical significance forms the core of the 
Serbian national myth. He arrived there as a largely unknown representative 
of the Central Committee to pacify inter-ethnic turbulence in the southern 
province. Thanks to Belgrade television, he returned to the Serbian capital as 
a new Serbian hero and the protector of endangered Serbs in Kosovo and, by 
extension, in Yugoslavia as whole.8 By the end of that year, he had removed the 
head of the Serbian party (and his political mentor and one-time friend) Ivan 
Stambolić from office and had become the undisputable chief in Serbia.
The political setting obviously changed dramatically and Yugoslavia in 1988 
was a much different political landscape, which allowed competing ideas on 
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how to define political community or communities – in Yugoslav, republican 
or ethnic terms? – to flourish. In August 1988, amid an atmosphere of rising 
suspicion towards Milošević’s political intentions and his role in the Kosovo 
crisis, Serbia drafted a series of amendments to the SFRY Constitution for 
discussion. The proposed amendments aimed at the recentralization of the 
Federation and the restriction of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
Predictably, any move towards the reinforcement of Serbia’s position within the 
Federation was perceived by other republics as detrimental to their own status 
and was immediately associated with Serbian nationalism. Serbia suggested the 
transformation of the Federal Assembly’s Chamber of Republics and Provinces 
and the Federal Chamber into the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, the 
Chamber of Citizens and the Chamber of Associated Labor. The Chamber of 
Citizens was supposed to represent citizens proportionally (Ramet 2006: 338–
339). For our analysis, centred as it is on citizenship, and from the vantage point 
of Yugoslavia’s later disintegration, this suggestion could be interpreted as a 
move to reinforce a pan-Yugoslav political culture, a move which could possibly 
have initiated a pan-Yugoslav (as opposed to republican or ethnonationalist) 
politics. Nevertheless, in the context in which inter-republican balance was 
shaken (a balance that more often than not stood for inter-ethnic balance), the 
proposed amendments were accused of benefiting only one republic, Serbia, and 
only one group, ethnic Serbs, who were numerically the largest Yugoslav nation. 
Not surprisingly, all other republics, with the exception of Montenegro, rejected 
the idea.
Since these reforms failed to break the deadlock, the following year brought 
several serious attacks on the de facto Yugoslav confederation: first, Yugoslavia 
faced a unilateral attempt at recentralization by Serbia, and Slovenia made an 
attempt at unilateral decentralization. Belgrade’s unilateral recentralization 
of Serbia attacked both the de facto Serbian federation as defined by the 
1974 Constitution and, by extension, the confederal constitutional structure 
of Yugoslavia as a whole. By the end of 1988, massive demonstrations in 
Vojvodina and Montenegro – the so-called anti-bureaucratic or yogurt 
revolution – toppled local government officials who were later replaced with 
individuals loyal to Milošević (see Vladisavljević 2008). On 18 March 1989, 
the Serbian parliament adopted amendments to the Constitution of Serbia 
which abolished the large degree of autonomy enjoyed by its two provinces 
(Vojvodina and Kosovo). These amendments were later confirmed in a new 
Constitution of Serbia adopted in September 1990. Although Serbia had 
effectively re-centralized itself unilaterally, it kept the two seats at the SFRY 
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Presidency reserved for its autonomous provinces. Combined with the loyal 
vote from Montenegro, Serbia suddenly had four out of eight votes at the 
Presidency at its disposal, placing the delicate balance between the republics 
in jeopardy.
In September 1989, Slovenia made a unilateral attempt at decentralization 
when its parliament adopted amendments to the Constitution of Slovenia. The 
tenth amendment stated that Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia on the basis of 
its right to self-determination and secession. Crucially, the seventy-second 
amendment proclaimed that only the Slovenian parliament could determine 
how this right should be exercised. The Yugoslav Constitutional Court found 
this amendment to be in conflict with the SFRY Constitution according to 
which the borders of the SFRY could not be altered without the mutual consent 
of the republics and provinces.
Therefore, even before the Fourteenth and last Congress of the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990, the country that they had 
resurrected in 1945, unified under their leadership and dictatorship and 
progressively decentralized together with their own party, was deeply 
divided along republican and, increasingly, ethnic lines. After his successful 
recentralization of Serbia and subjugation of Montenegro, Milošević attempted 
to consolidate his position and impose the recentralization of both the LCY 
and Yugoslavia as whole. After Slovenian suggestions were rejected en bloc 
by Milošević’s supporters, the Slovenian delegation left the Congress, quickly 
followed by the Croatian delegation. From that point on, the League ceased 
to exist as such. The republican parties hastily organized democratic elections 
according to their own schedule and without coordinating with other 
republics. It is interesting to note that the Slovenian and Croatian Parties 
that left the Congress were formed in 1937 as part of the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia’s solution to the national question. By that decision, the Party 
explicitly rejected unitarism – which had been tainted by association with 
Serbia’s dominant role within Yugoslavia – in its internal organization as 
well as in the organization of a future socialist multinational Yugoslavia. 
How deeply the national question – and the solution based on the equality of 
constitutive units and nations – was bound up with the existence of the Party 
as such was demonstrated at its last Congress: as soon as unitarism threatened 
to dominate the Party, it dissolved. The open question was whether federal 
Yugoslavia could survive the Party that had created it. We know the answer 
today, but back then there were still many possibilities to reform and save the 
country, or, short of that, to avoid violence.

